

Operating Systems Design

18. Cryptography: An Introduction

Paul Krzyzanowski
pxk@cs.rutgers.edu

Cryptography \neq Security

Cryptography may be a component of a secure system

Adding cryptography may not make a system secure

Terms

Plaintext (cleartext), message M

encryption, $E(M)$

produces ciphertext, $C=E(M)$

decryption: $M=D(C)$

Cryptographic algorithm, cipher

Terms: types of ciphers

- restricted cipher
- symmetric algorithm
- public key algorithm

Restricted cipher


Secret algorithm

- Vulnerable to:
 - Leaking
 - Reverse engineering
 - HD DVD (Dec 2006) and Blu-Ray (Jan 2007)
 - RC4
 - All digital cellular encryption algorithms
 - DVD and DIVX video compression
 - Firewire
 - Enigma cipher machine
 - Every NATO and Warsaw Pact algorithm during Cold War
- Not a viable approach!

The key




The key



Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pin_tumbler_lock

The key



Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pin_tumbler_lock

The key

- We understand how it works:
 - Strengths
 - Weaknesses
- Based on this understanding, we can assess how much to trust the key & lock.



Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pin_tumbler_lock

Symmetric algorithm

Secret key

$$C = E_K(M)$$

$$M = D_K(C)$$

Public key algorithm

Public and private keys

$$C_1 = E_{\text{public}}(M)$$

$$M = D_{\text{private}}(C_1)$$

also:

$$C_2 = E_{\text{private}}(M)$$

$$M = D_{\text{public}}(C_2)$$

McCarthy's puzzle (1958)

The setting:

- Two countries are at war
- One country sends spies to the other country
- To return safely, spies must give the border guards a password
- Spies can be trusted
- Guards chat – information given to them may leak

McCarthy's puzzle

Challenge

How can a guard authenticate a person without knowing the password?

Enemies cannot use the guard's knowledge to introduce their own spies

Solution to McCarthy's puzzle

Michael Rabin, 1958

Use **one-way function**, $B = f(A)$

- Guards get B
 - Enemy cannot compute A if they know A
- Spies give A , guards compute $f(A)$
 - If the result is B , the password is correct.

Example function:

Middle squares

- Take a 100-digit number (A), and square it
- Let B = middle 100 digits of 200-digit result

One-way functions

- Easy to compute in one direction
- Difficult to compute in the other

Examples:

Factoring:

$pq = N$ EASY
 find p, q given N DIFFICULT

Discrete Log:

$a^b \bmod c = N$ EASY
 find b given a, c, N DIFFICULT

McCarthy's puzzle example

Example with an 18 digit number

$A = 289407349786637777$

$A^2 = 83756614110525308948445338203501729$

Middle square, $B = 110525308948445338$

Given A , it is easy to compute B

Given B , it is extremely hard to compute A

More terms

- **one-way function**
 - Rabin, 1958: McCarthy's problem
 - middle squares, exponentiation, ...
- **[one-way] hash function**
 - message digest, fingerprint, cryptographic checksum, integrity check
- **encrypted hash**
 - message authentication code
 - only possessor of key can validate message

More terms

- **Stream cipher**
 - Encrypt a message a character at a time
- **Block cipher**
 - Encrypt a message a chunk at a time

Cryptography: what is it good for?

- **Authentication**
 - determine origin of message
- **Integrity**
 - verify that message has not been modified
- **Nonrepudiation**
 - sender should not be able to falsely deny that a message was sent
- **Confidentiality**
 - others cannot read contents of the message

Cryptographic toolbox

- Symmetric encryption
- Public key encryption
- One-way hash functions
- Random number generators

Popular hash functions

- **MD5**
 - 128 bits
- **SHA-2**
 - Designed by the NSA; published by NIST
 - SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
 - e.g., Linux passwords used MD5 and now SHA-512
- **SHA-3**
 - Under development
- Derivations from ciphers:
 - **Blowfish** (used for password hashing in OpenBSD)
 - **3DES** – used for old Linux password hashes

Popular symmetric algorithms

- **DES, 3DES**
 - FIPS standard since 1976
 - 56-bit key; operates on 64-bit (8-byte) blocks
 - Triple DES recommended since 1999 (112 or 168 bits)
- **AES** (Advanced Encryption Standard)
 - FIPS standard since 2002
 - 128, 192, or 256-bit keys; operates on 128-bit blocks
- **Blowfish**
 - Key length from 23-448 bits; 64-bit blocks
- **IDEA**
 - 128-bit keys; operates on 64-bit blocks
 - More secure than DES but faster algorithms are available

Is DES secure?

56-bit key makes DES relatively weak

- 7.2×10^{16} keys
- Brute-force attack

Late 1990's:

- DES cracker machines built to crack DES keys in a few hours
- DES Deep Crack: 90 billion keys/second
- Distributed.net: test 250 billion keys/second

The power of 2

Adding an extra bit to a key doubles the search space.

Suppose it takes 1 second to attack a 20-bit key:

- 21-bit key: 2 seconds
- 32-bit key: 1 hour
- 40-bit key: 12 days
- 56-bit key: 2,178 years
- 64-bit key: >557,000 years!

AES

From NIST:

Assuming that one could build a machine that could recover a DES key in a second (i.e., try 2^{56} keys per second), then it would take that machine approximately 149 trillion years to crack a 128-bit AES key. To put that into perspective, the universe is believed to be less than 20 billion years old.

<http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/>

Increasing The Key

Can double encryption work for DES?

- Useless if we could find a key K such that:

$$E_K(P) = E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(P))$$

- This does not hold for DES (luckily!)

Double DES

Vulnerable to meet-in-the-middle attack

If we know some pair (P, C) , then:

- [1] Encrypt P for all 2^{56} values of K_1
- [2] Decrypt C for all 2^{56} values of K_2

For each match where [1] = [2]

- test the two keys against another P, C pair
- if match, you are assured that you have the key

Triple DES

Triple DES with two 56-bit keys:

$$C = E_{K_1}(D_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(P)))$$

Triple DES with three 56-bit keys:

$$C = E_{K_3}(D_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(P)))$$


Decryption used in middle step for compatibility with DES ($K_1=K_2=K_3$)

$$C = E_K(D_K(E_K(P))) \equiv C = E_{K_1}(P)$$

Secure Communication

Communicating with symmetric cryptography


- Both parties must agree on a secret key, K
- Message is encrypted, sent, decrypted at other side



- Key distribution must be secret
 - otherwise messages can be decrypted
 - users can be impersonated

Key explosion

Each pair of users needs a separate key for secure communication



Key distribution

Secure key distribution is the biggest problem with symmetric cryptography

Key exchange

How can you communicate securely with someone you've never met?

Whit Diffie: idea for a *public key* algorithm

Challenge: can this be done securely?

Knowledge of public key should not allow derivation of private key

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Key distribution algorithm

- first algorithm to use public/private keys
- *not* public key encryption
- based on difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in a finite field compared with ease of calculating exponentiation

Allows us to negotiate a secret **session key** without fear of eavesdroppers

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- All arithmetic performed in a field of integers modulo some large number
- Both parties agree on
 - a **large prime number p**
 - and a **number $\alpha < p$**
- Each party generates a public/private key pair

private key for user i : X_i

public key for user i : $Y_i = \alpha^{X_i} \bmod p$

Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange

- Alice has secret key X_A
- Bob has secret key X_B
- Alice has public key Y_A
- Bob has public key Y_B
- Alice computes

$$K = Y_B^{X_A} \bmod p$$

$$K = (\text{Bob's public key}) (\text{Alice's private key}) \bmod p$$

Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange

- Alice has secret key X_A
- Alice has public key Y_A
- Alice computes
- Bob has secret key X_B
- Bob has public key Y_B
- Bob computes

$$K = Y_B^{X_A} \bmod p$$

$$K' = Y_A^{X_B} \bmod p$$

$K' = (\text{Alice's public key}) (\text{Bob's private key}) \bmod p$

Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange

- Alice has secret key X_A
- Alice has public key Y_A
- Alice computes
- expanding:
- Bob has secret key X_B
- Bob has public key Y_B
- Bob computes
- expanding:

$$K = Y_B^{X_A} \bmod p$$

$$K' = Y_A^{X_B} \bmod p$$

$$K = Y_B^{X_A} \bmod p$$

$$= (\alpha^{X_B} \bmod p)^{X_A} \bmod p$$

$$= \alpha^{X_B X_A} \bmod p$$

$$K' = Y_A^{X_B} \bmod p$$

$$= (\alpha^{X_A} \bmod p)^{X_B} \bmod p$$

$$= \alpha^{X_A X_B} \bmod p$$

$$K = K'$$

K is a common key, known only to Bob and Alice

RSA: Public Key Cryptography

- Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, Leonard Adleman created a true public key encryption algorithm in 1977
- Each user generates two keys:
 - private key (kept secret)
 - public key (can be shared with anyone)
- Difficulty of algorithm based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers
 - keys are functions of a pair of large (~200 digits) prime numbers

RSA algorithm

Generate keys







- choose two random large prime numbers p, q
- Compute the product $n = pq$
- randomly choose the encryption key, e , such that:
 - e and $(p-1)(q-1)$ are relatively prime
- use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the decryption key, d :
 - $ed = 1 \bmod ((p-1)(q-1))$
 - $d = e^{-1} \bmod ((p-1)(q-1))$
- discard p, q



RSA Encryption

- Key pair: e, d
- Agreed-upon modulus: n
- Encrypt:
 - divide data into numerical blocks $< n$
 - encrypt each block:
 - $c = m^e \bmod n$
- Decrypt:
 - $m = c^d \bmod n$


Communication with public key algorithms

- Different keys for encrypting and decrypting
 - no need to worry about key distribution





- ### Digital Signatures
- Validate the creator (signer) of the content
 - Validate the the content has not been modified since it was signed
 - The content does not have to be encrypted



- ### But
- We don't want to permute/hide the content
 - If Alice was sending binary data to Bob, how would he deduce that it decrypted correctly
 - Public key encryption is considerably slower than symmetric encryption

- ### Signatures: Hashes to the rescue!
- Create a **hash** of the message
 - **Encrypt the hash** with your public key and send it with the message
 - Recipient **validate the hash** by decrypting it with your public key and comparing it with the hash of the received message

Digital signatures - public key cryptography

Alice Bob

$H(P)$

Alice generates a hash of the message

Digital signatures - public key cryptography

Alice Bob

$H(P)$

$E_p(H(P))$

Alice encrypts the hash with her private key

Digital signatures - public key cryptography

Alice Bob

$H(P)$

$E_p(H(P))$

Alice sends Bob the message and the encrypted hash

Digital signatures - public key cryptography

Alice Bob

$H(P)$

$C = E_p(H(P))$

$H(P)$

$H' = D_A(C)$

- Bob decrypts the has using Alice's public key
- Bob computes the hash of the message sent by Alice

Digital signatures - public key cryptography

Alice Bob

$H(P)$

$C = E_p(H(P))$

$H(P)$

$H' = D_A(C)$

If the hashes match

- the encrypted hash *must* have been generated by Alice
- the signature is valid

Digital signatures - multiple signers

Alice Bob Charles

$H(P)$

$C = E_p(H(P))$

$H(P)$

$C_2 = E_b(H(P))$

Bob generates a hash (same as Alice's) and encrypts it with his private key

- sends Charles: {message, Alice's encrypted hash, Bob's encrypted hash}

Digital signatures - multiple signers

Alice:

- generates a hash of the message: $H(P)$
- encrypts Alice's encrypted hash with Alice's public key
- validates Alice's signature

Bob:

- decrypts Bob's encrypted hash with Bob's public key
- validates Bob's signature

Charles:

- generates a hash of the message: $H(P)$
- decrypts Alice's encrypted hash with Alice's public key
- validates Alice's signature
- decrypts Bob's encrypted hash with Bob's public key
- validates Bob's signature

Covert AND authenticated messaging

If we want to keep the message secret

- combine **encryption** with a **digital signature**
- use a **session key**: pick a **random key, K**, to encrypt the message with a symmetric algorithm
- **encrypt K** with the public key of each recipient
- for signing, **encrypt the hash** of the message with sender's private key

Secure and authenticated messaging

Alice generates a digital signature by encrypting the message digest with her private key.

Secure and authenticated messaging

Alice picks a random key, K, and encrypts the message (P) with it using a symmetric algorithm.

Secure and authenticated messaging

Alice encrypts the session key for each recipient of this message: Bob and Charles using their public keys.

Secure and authenticated messaging

The aggregate message is sent to Bob and Charles

Secure and authenticated messaging

Message from Alice

- Message: [diagonal lines]
- Signature: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Bob: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Charles: [diagonal lines]

$K = E_b(C_2)$

Bob receives the message:
- extracts key by decrypting it with his private key

Secure and authenticated messaging

Message from Alice

- Message: [diagonal lines]
- Signature: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Bob: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Charles: [diagonal lines]

$P = D_K(C)$

$K = E_b(C_2)$

Bob decrypts the message using K

Secure and authenticated messaging

Message from Alice

- Message: [diagonal lines]
- Signature: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Bob: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Charles: [diagonal lines]

$P = D_K(C) \rightarrow H(P)$

$K = E_b(C_2)$

Bob computes the hash of the message

Secure and authenticated messaging

Message from Alice

- Message: [diagonal lines]
- Signature: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Bob: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Charles: [diagonal lines]

$P = D_K(C) \rightarrow H(P)$

$K = E_b(C_2)$

Directory of public keys

K_A

Bob looks up Alice's public key

Secure and authenticated messaging

Message from Alice

- Message: [diagonal lines]
- Signature: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Bob: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Charles: [diagonal lines]

$P = D_K(C) \rightarrow H(P)$

$H_1 = D_A(C_1)$

$K = E_b(C_2)$

Bob decrypts Alice's signature using Alice's public key

Secure and authenticated messaging

Message from Alice

- Message: [diagonal lines]
- Signature: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Bob: [diagonal lines]
- Key for Charles: [diagonal lines]


$P = D_K(C) \rightarrow H(P)$

$H_1 = D_A(C_1)$

$K = E_b(C_2)$

$H_1 = H(P) ?$

Bob validates Alice's signature



The End